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Abstract—Authentication is a key element of security, by
which a receiver confirms the sender identity of a message.
Typical approaches include either key-based authentication at
the application layer or physical layer authentication (PLA),
where a message is considered authentic if it appears to have
gone through the legitimate channel. In both cases a source of
randomness is needed, whereas for PLA the random nature of the
communication channel is exploited. In this paper we compare
the various approaches using in all cases the channel as a source
of randomness. We consider a multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) system with a finite number of antennas. Simple auto-
regressive (AR) models for its evolution as well as the relation
of the legitimate and attacker channel are considered. In this
setting the attacker can either predict the key used for key-based
authentication or forge the channel estimated at the legitimate
receiver for PLA. The analysis includes both symmetric and
asymmetric key-based authentication. We compare the schemes
in terms of false alarm and missed detection probability and we
outline best attack strategies.
Index Terms—Authentication, Cryptographic Authentication,
Physical layer security, Symmetric and Asymmetric Authentica-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
By authentication the destination establishes if a received
message is coming from the claimed source or not. Typi-
cally, this procedure is performed at the application layer by
means of cryptographic protocols that are either symmetric
or asymmetric, i.e., either a key is shared by the source and
destination or a couple of private/public keys is generated by
the source that uses the private key to encrypt a message,
whose authenticity can be confirmed by any destination having
the public key [1]. In both cases, a source of randomness must
be available to generate the secret (private) key, and the key
must be renewed from time to time to cope with the possibility
that the key has been disclosed to the attacker, e.g., due to
either protocol vulnerabilities or intensive computational effort
by the attacker, possibly supported by quantum computing.
An alternative authentication approach is implemented (typ-
ically in wireless systems) at the physical layer in the so-called
physical layer authentication (PLA)). It consists in checking if
the channel over which the message arrives to the destination
remains unaltered over time: in general, the destination will
experience different channels to the attacker and the legitimate
transmitter, due to their different position and other wireless
phenomena. Further details and possible attacks are described
in [2]–[4].
In this paper the unique source of randomness is assumed
to be the wireless channel, as estimated by the either or both
the transmitter and receiver. Therefore we can compare both
PLA and cryptography-based authentication techniques. We
consider a finite number of flat antennas for multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems, over which the randomness
is obtained to generate the key, therefore we do not apply
asymptotic capacity results. The aim is to compare the various
authentication schemes in terms of probability of false alarm
(FA) and missed detection (MD), i.e. the probability that a
packet coming from the legitimate source is not authenticated
and a packet coming from the attacker is accepted as legiti-
mate, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the MIMO channel model described by a matrix
with N entries and its evolution. The three considered authen-
tication schemes, namely asymmetric-key based authentication
(AKBA), symmetric-key based authentication (SKBA) and
PLA are described in Section III. Performance of the schemes
in terms of FA and MD probabilities is assessed in Section
IV. Finally, conclusions are outlined in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the usual three users model in security, where
Alice aims at authenticating messages coming from Bob, and
Eve aims at sending messages to Alice impersonating Bob.
In particular, after an initialization stage, upon reception of
a packet Alice aims at taking a decision between the two
hypothesis H0: the packet is coming from Bob or H1: the
packet is not coming from Bob.
We assume that the only sources of randomness are the
time-varying channels among devices, which are estimated
and used to provide the desired authentication process. In
particular, devices are equipped with M antennas each, imple-
menting a MIMO system, so that channels are described by
M ×M matrices. We assume that entries of channel matrices
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
normal (CN), and correlated over time and across devices.
Channel matrices are converted into vectors of size N =
M2, so that h(t) = [h1(t), . . . , hN (t)] is the Alice-Bob
channel (assumed to be reciprocal) at slot t. We assume
an auto-regressive (AR) evolution of the channel, i.e., for
n = 1, . . . , N
hn(t) = αhn(t− 1) +
√
1− α2zn(t) , (1)
where α is the correlation factor and zn(t) are i.i.d. CN
variables.
A similar channel model is available between Eve and both
Alice and Bob. In particular the reciprocal Alice-Eve channel
is
g1,n(t) = β1hn(t) +
√
1− β21z1,n(t) , (2)
and the Bob-Eve channel is
g2,n(t) = β2hn(t) +
√
1− β22z2,n(t) , (3)
where β· are correlation factors and z·,n(t) are CN variables.
In order to exploit the channel as a random source the users
must estimate it, and this is obtained by letting one of the two
legitimate users to transmit pilot symbols. In particular, the
channel estimate obtained by Alice when Bob is transmitting
pilots is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)-corrupted
version of hn(t), i.e.,
hˆA,n(t) = hn(t) + σAwA,n(t) , (4)
where wA,n(t) are i.i.d. CN variable. Similarly for a pilot
transmission by Alice, Bob estimates
hˆB,n(t) = hn(t) + σBwB,n(t) , (5)
where wB,n(t) are i.i.d. CN variable. Lastly, when either Alice
(i = 1) or Bob (i = 2) are transmitting, Eve obtains estimates
gˆi,n(t) = gi,n(t) + σEwE,n(t) , (6)
where wE,n(t) are i.i.d. CN variable.
Attacker Model: Here we consider that Eve will only try
to transmit packets impersonating Alice, while not performing
attacks aiming at disrupting the authentication process (such
as jamming and pilot contamination attacks) that will be
considered in future studies. We assume that Eve is able to
transmit modifying the transmitted signal so that Alice will
estimate any desired channel.
III. AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Three authentication schemes are considered: PLA, AKBA
and SKBA.
A. Physical Layer Authentication
PLA exploits the coherence time of the channel in order
to provide authentication. In synthesis, it provides two steps:
a) the initialization step by which the channel to the user to
be authenticated is measured, being sure that the legitimate
node is transmitting; b) the authentication step, in which upon
reception of a packet the channel is estimated again and
compared with that estimated in the initialization step.
Let us now consider the detailed implementation of PLA in
the considered scenario. We first observe that we can rewrite
hˆA,n(t) as
hˆA,n(t) = α
t−1hn(1) + γA(t)ǫn(t) , (7)
with ǫn(t) i.i.d. CN variables and γ
2
A(t) = σ
2
A+(1−α2)αt−1.
The physical layer authentication as described in [2] in-
cludes the following phases:
1) In the first slot Bob transmits pilots to Alice, who
estimates the channel hˆA,n(1). This first transmission
is assumed to be authenticated with some other means
other than PLA.
2) At slot t > 1, when Alice receives a packet that contains
pilot symbols, she estimates the channel hˆA,n(t) then
she computes the distance between it and the channel
estimated at the first slot as
ψ(t) =
1
Nγ2A(t)
N∑
n=1
|hˆA,n(t)− αt−1hˆA,n(1)|2 , (8)
and decides that the packet is authentic if
ψ(t) < θ(t) , (9)
otherwise she discards it as non-authentic.
3) Eve on her side estimates the channel from Bob in the
first slot gˆ2,n(1) and in forthcoming slots she estimates
the channel from Alice and Bob whenever they are
transmitting. Then she obtain the maximum likelihood
(ML) estimate of the Alice-Bob channel at the first slot
h˜E,n(t), which is used to impersonate Bob by forging
channel αt−1h˜E,n(t) at slot t.
We now suppose that at odd slots (starting from t = 1) Bob
is transmitting, and at even slots Alice is transmitting. Then
at slot t = 2ν + 1, with ν natural number, Eve performs the
attack. From (1) and (2) we can write gˆi,n(t) as a function of
hn(1) as
gˆi,n(t) =βiα
t−1hn(1) + βi
√
1− α2
t∑
k=2
αt−kzn(k)+
+
√
1− β2i zi,n(t) + σEwE,n(t)
=βiα
t−1hn(1) + ui,n(t) ,
(10)
with ui,n(τ), τ = 1, . . . , t CN variables. Now, let w(2ν) be
a 2ν-size column vector with entries [w]2j+i = β2−iα
2j+i−1,
and gˆn(2ν) be the column vector collecting channel estimates
at Eve up to slot 2ν for channel entry n, then
gˆn(2ν) = whn(1) + u , (11)
with Gaussian zero-mean random vector u having correlation
matrix K = E[uHu] with entries
[K]t1,t2 = (σ
2
E + 1− β21+t1|2))δ(t1 − t2)
+ β1+t1|2β1+t2|2(1− α2)×
× E
[
t1∑
k1=2
αt1−k1zn(k1)
t2∑
k2=2
αt2−k2zn(k2)
]
=(σ2E + 1− β21+t1|2)δ(t1 − t2)
+ β1+t1|2β1+t2|2(1− α2)
min{t1,t2}∑
k=2
α2(t−k)
=(σ2E + 1− β21+t1|2)δ(t1 − t2)
+ β1+t1|2β1+t2|2(1− α2(min{t1,t2}−1)) ,
(12)
and t|2 denotes the reminder of a division of t by 2. The ML
estimate of hn(1) is obtained as
h˜E,n(t) = (w
HK−1w)−1wHK−1gˆn(2ν) . (13)
When multiple attacks are possible, an exploration of the
channel space h(1) can be performed, where the first at-
tempted point is the ML estimate (13) and then the other
points correspond to the next most probable channels, given
the observations. This approach has been explored in [2].
B. Asymmetric-key Based Authentication
With AKBA we exploit the channel as a random number
generator and the random number is then used to generate a
couple of private and public keys that will be used to sign
and check the packets to be authenticated. In particular, the
randomness is used by Bob to generate a private/public key
couple. The public key is broadcast to all users and when Bob
transmits packets he will encrypt a time-varying signature with
the private key, and Alice will be able to decrypt it using the
public key, thus ensuring that the packet is authentic.
Let us now provide the details of key generation for AKBA
in the considered scenario. The AKBA works as follows:
1) At slot 1 Alice transmits pilots and Bob estimates the
channel hˆB,n(1).
2) Bob quantizes the real and imaginary parts of the
channel estimate with a quantizer of KQ quantization
levels and saturation value vsat, obtaining a bit sequence
b.
3) Bob applies a known (to all users) hashing and compres-
sion function to extract a shorter key from b and then
generate a private and public key couple (SA, PA).
4) At slot 2 Bob broadcasts the public key PA. In his
transmissions Bob encodes a (time-varying) signature
with the private key so that Alice is able to authenticate
messages coming from Bob.
5) Eve estimates the channel in the first slot gˆ1,n(1) and
the channel in the second slot gˆ2,n(2).
6) From the two estimates she will obtain a bit sequence bˆ
as detailed in the following.
7) Eve uses bˆ as the key to generate a private and public
key couple (SE, PE) and performs attacks signing the
time-varying signature with the private key SE.
Optimal Attack: Let us now derive the optimal choice
of bˆ by Eve at slot t = 2ν + 1 after she has collected ν
observations of the channels to Alice and Bob. We now have
that at odd slots (starting from t = 1) Bob is transmitting,
and at even slots Alice is transmitting. Now, let w′ be a 2ν-
size column vector with entries [w′]2j+i = βiα
2j+i−1, and let
gˆ′n(2ν) be the column vector collecting channel estimates at
Eve up to slot 2ν for channel entry n, then
gˆ′n(2ν) = w
′hn(1) + u
′ , (14)
where Gaussian zero-mean random vector u′ has correlation
matrix K ′ = E[u
′Hu′] with entries (obtained analogously as
in the previous section)
[K ′]t1,t2 = (σ
2
E + 1− β22−t1|2)δ(t1 − t2)
+ β2−t1|2β2−t2|2(1 − α2(min{t1,t2}−1)) .
(15)
Indicating with (τk, τk+1] the quantization interval for the
quantization level k = 1, . . . ,KQ, and τ1 = −τKQ+1 = ∞,
the index of the most probable quantized value (for the real
part) is
k∗ = argmaxkP[ℜ{hn(1)} ∈ (τk, τk+1]|gˆ′n(2ν)]
=argmaxk
∫ τk+1
τk
pℜ{hn(1)}|gˆ′n(2ν)(h|gˆ′n(2ν))dh
=argmaxk
∫ τk+1
τk
pgˆ′n(2ν)|ℜ{hn(1)}(gˆ
′
n(2ν)|h)dh
=argmaxk
∫ τk+1
τk
e−
1
2
(gˆ′n(2ν)−w
′h)HK−1(gˆ′n(2ν)−w
′h)dh .
(16)
Now, defining
a = w
′Hw′ , (17)
b = −gˆ′Hn (2ν)K ′w′ −w
′HK ′gˆ′n(2ν) , (18)
we have
k∗ = argmaxk
∫ τk+1
τk
e−(ah
2+bh)dh
= argmaxk
[
erf
(
2aτk+1 + b
2
√
a
)
− erf
(
2aτk + b
2
√
a
)]
,
(19)
with erf the error function of the normal distribution.
Also in this case if multiple attacks are available, various
quantized points can be explored, jointly among all 2N
quantized value. Therefore, after having considered the key
obtained using quantized values (19), we must find the next
quantized values in all N observations having the highest
probability, thus changing only one quantized value, and so
on.
C. Symmetric-key Based Authentication
With SKBA the two legitimate devices must agree on a
secret key by which authentication is performed. In particular,
once Alice and Bob has agreed on a (secret) key, when Bob is
transmitting a packet it will encode a time-varying signature
with the secret key so that Alice can check that the packet is
coming from Bob.
For the establishment of the secret key we resort to the
source-based secret key agreement method [5] where the two
users extract the quantized randomness from the channel and
then go through the steps of advantage distillation, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification. In particular, in the
step of information reconciliation error correcting codes are
used to ensure that the keys between the two users coincide.
We consider the following scheme, in which all users have
agreed on a codebook C of codewords of length N :
1) At slot 1 Alice transmits a set of pilot symbols and Bob
estimates the channel hB,n(1). Eve estimates the channel
gˆ1,n(1).
2) At slot 2 Bob transmits a set of pilot symbols and
Alice estimates the channel hA,n(2). Alice finds in C
the codeword closest to hA(2), vector collecting the
channels for all 2N observations , i.e.
c∗A = argminc∈C ||hˆA(2)− c||2 . (20)
Eve estimates the channel gˆ2,n(2).
3) Alice sends the error of her estimated channel with
respect to the selected codeword, i.e.,
ǫ = hˆA(2)− c∗A . (21)
4) Bob computes h˜B = hˆB(1) − ǫ and decodes it in the
codebook C, i.e., computes
c∗B = argminc∈C ||h˜B − c||2 . (22)
5) Eve obtains from the two estimates at point 1) and 2)
the ML estimate of the Alice-Bob channel h˜E(1), adds
ǫ and decodes the resulting vector, i.e., she computes
c∗E = argminc∈C ||h˜E(1)− ǫ− c||2 . (23)
6) The three users will apply a hash function to the index
of the decoded sequences to extract Rn bits that will be
used as key for authentication.
In this case multiple attacks can be performed by consid-
ering the next most probable decoded codewords, given the
observations.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We consider now the performance of each authentication
scheme separately, in terms of FA and MD probabilities.
A. Physical Layer Authentication
For the PLA scheme FA and MD probabilities have been
derived in [2] without considering the channel evolution of
(1).
Conditioned on H0 and for any value of hˆA,n(1), Ψ(t),
t > 1 is a central chi-square distributed random variable with
2n degrees of freedom, yielding the FA probability
PPLA,FA = P[Ψ(t) > θ(t)|H0] = 1− F2n,0(θ(t)) , (24)
where
F2n,µ(x) =1−Qn(√µ,
√
x)
=e−
µ
2
∞∑
k=0
(
−µ
2
)k γ (n+ k, x2 )
k!
(25)
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a chi-square
random variable with 2n degrees of freedom and noncentrality
parameter µ, Qn(
√
µ,
√
x) is the Marcum Q-function, and
γ(a; b) is the normalized lower incomplete gamma function.
Conditioned onH1, the realization of hˆAn(1) and the forged
channel h˜E,n(1), Ψ(t) is a noncentral chi-square distributed
random variable with 2n degrees of freedom and noncentrality
parameter
β(t) =
1
Nγ2A(t)
N∑
n=1
|h˜E,n(t)− αt−1hˆA,n(1)|2 (26)
which provides the MD probability
PPLA,MD(h(1), h˜(t)) = P[Ψ(t) ≤ θ(t)|H1,h(1), h˜(t)]
= F2n,β(t)(θ(t)) .
(27)
B. Asymmetric-key Based Authentication
For the AKBA scheme, Bob generates a secret private
key from the channel and then he obtains a public key.
Assuming that the broadcast of the public key is error-free
and authenticated, no FA will ever occur, thus
PAKBA,FA = 0 . (28)
The MD will instead be related to the ability of Eve to predict
the private key. In particular we have
PAKBA,MD = P[b = bˆ] = P[q = qˆ] , (29)
where q and qˆ are vectors of quantized values by Alice and
Eve, respectively.
C. Symmetric-key Based Authentication
For the SKBA scheme the FA probability is the probability
that c∗A and c
∗
B do not coincide. The MD probability is the
probability that c∗E and c
∗
A coincide, so that Eve is able to
break the authentication system.
We first observe that all users have ǫ available and the
resulting estimates after its removal are
h˜A = c
∗
A , h˜B = c
∗
A + σBwB + σAwA , (30)
h˜E = c
∗
A + σEwE + σAwA . (31)
Hence the FA probability PSKBA,FA is the probability that Bob
does not decode c∗A and the MD probability PSKBA,MD is the
probability that Eve decodes c∗A.
Considering the hypothesis testing problem of decoding at
Bob, we define the log-likelihood function
ΛB(c
∗
A, h˜B) =
1
N
ln
ph˜B|h˜A(h˜B|c∗A)
ph˜B(h˜B)
, (32)
and we have that PSKBA,FA is the missed detection probability
of the detection process, i.e.,
P SKBA,FA = πB,MD(c
∗
A, λ)
=P[ΛB(c
∗
A, h˜B) ≤ λ] , h˜B ∼ ph˜B|h˜A , h˜A = c∗A .
(33)
On the other hand, the FA probability of the detection process
sets an upper bound on the rate of the secret key R, therefore
the threshold λ, in particular
R ≤ − 1
N
log2 πB,FA(λ) (34)
where
πB,FA(λ) = P[ΛB(c
∗
A, h˜B) > λ] h˜B ∼ ph˜B . (35)
Following similar derivations to those for the FA, it turns out
that the MD probability of the authentication process is the
complementary of the MD probability of the detection process
at Eve, i.e., defining
ΛE(c
∗
A, h˜E) =
1
N
ln
ph˜E|h˜A(h˜E|c∗A)
ph˜E(h˜E)
, (36)
we have
P SKBA,MD = 1− πB,MD(c∗A, λ)
=1− P[ΛE(c∗A, h˜E) > λ] , h˜E ∼ ph˜E|h˜A , h˜A = c∗A .
(37)
Efficient methods to compute the FA and MD probabilities of
the detection process have been derived in [6].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have considered a MIMO time-varying
channel model among two legitimate users and an eaves-
dropper. We have compared three authentication methods, all
based on the randomness of the MIMO channels: physical
layer authentication, asymmetric-key based authentication and
symmetric-key based authentication. We have described how
to exploit the channel in this scenario, which is the best attack
by the eavesdropper and we have obtained the performance
in terms of FA and MD probabilities for the authentication
process.
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